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Xanana speaks from his cell 
From his cell in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, has 
called on the resistance to ''proceed on our march to victory". In a taped message, Xanana repeated 
his rallying call when still in the bush: "We resist in order to win". 
Many documents smuggled out 
Xanana's message to the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM) and FALINTIL, the National Army for 
the Liberation of East Timor, was recorded in prison on 7 
December, the "18th anniversary of the cowardly invasion 
of our beloved country". The tape reached the outside world 
together with a number of letters. Publication of some of 
these letters in the Portuguese press infuriated the 
Indonesian authorities. They accused him of 0damaging 
Indonesia's good name internationally", withdrew his rights 
to have family and ICRC visits and declared that any 
remission to which he is entitled would be withheld. 
He highlighted the turning points in the struggle and 
described 1993 as "a difficult year, a year of emotions, of 
speculation, of real trauma, moral, psychic and political. 
But in spite of everything, the sacred flag of liberation 
continues to fly from the peak of Ramelau and Matabian, 
of Kab1ake and Tanamam". 
Student on trial for insulting Suharto 
Nuku Soleiman, 29 years old, chair of Yayasan Pi.jar (Pijar 
Foundation), which has recently emerged as one of the core 
groups organising protest actions, went on trial in Jakarta 
on 15 January. He is accused of producing and distributing 
a sticker which "insults the good name of the head of 
state". Under Article 134 of the Criminal Code, he faces a 
sentence of up to six years. This is not his first brush with 
authority. He was arrested in 1989 for participating in 
protests when electricity prices were hiked. 
Nuku was taken into custody on 25 November 1993, at 
the office of the Foundation, soon after security forces 
arrested five people at a demonstration calling for an end to 
the state lottery. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No 120, December 
1993) They were held for distributing stickers to people in 
the crowd. The sticker carried a slogan based on the initials 
of the lottery, SDSB: Suharto Dalang Segala Bencana! 
meaning, "Suharto, mastermind of all calamities". The 
sticker listed among the calamities, the killing of four land 
protesters in Madura last July, the killing of four members 
of the Haur Koneng Muslim sect in West Java earlier in 
1993, the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984, the 
Continued on p. 2 
He derided the army's claim that there is no-one left to 
conduct the struggle. The colonialists, he said, have a 
paternalistic attitude towards the people they colonise. 
"Whatever we do is wrong and they tell us: 'We are here to 
teach you what you do not know."' 
On the military situation he said: " ... there have been 
many (Indonesian) commanders in Dili and hundreds of 
battalion and company commanders that have operated in 
the jungle. But from 1979 until now, there have been only 
50 guerrilla fighters, according to the propaganda of Benny 
Moerdani. Moerdani wrote a book and confessed to being 
not guilty of what has happened in East Timor since the 
invasion. This gives out a sense of defeat, a clear sensation 
of the expression of shame. I recognised that the military is 
defeated on the ground but I did not say that F ALINTIL is 
defeated.... While we recognise our military incapacity, 
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Lampung massacre in February 1989, the thousands of 
killings in Aceb since 1989 and the Dili massacre in 
November 1991. 
Huge crowds attend first hearing 
As troops ringed the court-house, hundreds of supporters 
came to the Central Jakarta district court to attend the 
opening of the trial. Most bad to follow the proceedings 
through loudspeakers outside. Abdul Hakim Garusa Nusan-
tara, head of the team of defence laywers, protested at the 
large number of security personnel and anti:...riot troops 
surr01mding the court-house. 
A dapper Nub ent.ring the courtroom. 
Tempo, 22 JanuarJ 1994 
The indictment accused Nuku Soleiman of defamation of 
the head of state, in collusion with another Foundation 
member, Ardiyanto, who is "still at large". When asked by 
the presiding judge whether he understood the indictment, 
Nuku said, No. "I hope the judge can tell the prosecutor to 
convey the indictment in clear Indonesian language, not in 
the language of power." Nuku was not in a mood to make 
any concessions to court protocol and turned up dressed in 
a T-shirt, faded blue jeans and thongs. [Jakarta Post, 
17.1.1994] 
A row broke out when the judge said that, to save time, 
he would only allow one defence statement at the next 
stage of the proceedings, either from the defendant or from 
his lawyers.· Against strong opposition from the defence 
team, the judge finally agreed to allow two s~tements. 
Speaking in his own defence at the second heanng, Nuku 
said: "It's strange for a political statement to become a 
criminal case." With political opinion coming from the 
mouths of citizens every day, there won't be enough 
prosecutors to go round, he argued. 
His defence team said their client's constitutional right to 
free expression was violated by charging him with insulting 
the president. Article 134 was introduced in 1916 to protect 
Dutch colonial rule and is in violation of the constitution 
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
"A life of activism" 
Here are some remarks from an interview of Nuku in 
Salemba Prison, Jakarta: 
* "Why should criticing the President be called an 'insult'? 
In a presidential system of government such as we have in 
Indonesia, it is right for the president to take responsibility 
for everything that happens." 
* "We are trying to make the political situation here 
healthier. No fact-finding commission was ever set up to 
investigate the number of victims of the Tanjung Priok 
massacre. Political activities should not lead to charges in 
court except for things like assassinations or other acts of 
violence. In my case, all it's about is a sticker. 11 
* "I'm not prepared to say whether I had anything to do 
with the sticker. This has to be proven in court." 
* "I regret nothing. I have decided to dedicate myself to 
working for NGO activism. I will continue the struggle. 11 
* "I manage to read newspapers and books, behind the 
backs of the authorities. As for food, I have asked my 
friends to bring food. I refuse to drink the water they 
supply and boil everything myself. The prison officials treat 
me well." [Tempo, 15 January 1994]. 
Profile of Yayasan Pijar 
Yayasan Pi.jar, or the Pijar Foundation, has recently 
emerged as one of the key organisations involved in pro-
democracy activism in Indonesia. The organisation was set 
up in September 1989 by twenty student activists from 
Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta, several of whom bad 
already been in and out of prison. 
Anyone entering the premises of Pijar is greeted by a 
banner which reads: "If you're the hesitant type, you'd better 
go home." The name Pi.jar, which means 'glowing' or 'red-
hot', stands for Pusat lnformasi dan Jaringan Alesi Refor-
masi, the 'Information Centre and Network for Reform 
Actions', a rather modest-sounding name for a group that 
has been associated with a swathe of actions and demon-
strations over the past few years. Some people have even 
started calling it the 'demo bureau'. 
It has members and contacts in many places, particularly 
on university campuses, but hasn't revealed the size of its 
membership. It relies entirely on the membership for 
funding, in contrast with other NGOs, most of whom 
survive thanks largely to grants from foreign funding 
agencies. Being financially independent and relying on 
money contributed by the members is one of the Foundati-
on's principles. For demonstrations, activists are expected to 
produce their own bannerS with minimal help and cash from 
the organisation. 
The acting chair, Rachland S. Nashidik, who is in charge 
following the arrest of Nuku Soleiman, strongly denies that 
it is being steered by 'third parties', a charge levelled by the 
authorities to discredit activists by alleging that they are 
'used' by others for ulterior motives. 
Pijar's links with opposition groups like the Petition-of-
Fifty and the Legal Aid Institutes in the YLBHI are well 
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known. It is closely associated with the legal aid group, 
Ampera, in West Java, which assisted people defending 
their land rights in Cijayanti, Bogor some months ago. An 
Ampera lawyer, Dedi Ekabrata, is now in custody, because 
of his role in this dispute. 
Another of its activists, Bambang Beathor Soeryadi, 
spent four-and-a half years in prison for spreading hatred 
against the government. Yet another is Bonar Tigor 
Naipospos, who is serving an eight-year sentence in 
Yogyakarta. 
Train crash victim 
One of Pijar's leading activists, Hasbi bin Achmad Lallo, 
was killed in a train crash last November in Citayam, Bogor 
(West Java). He and other activists were on their way to 
Bogor to prepare for a demonstration protesting against the 
arrest of a number of people for allegedly inciting peasants 
in Rancamaya who were resisting plans to drive them off 
their land. The train crash itself led to further protests 
demanding the resignation of the Minister of Transport who 
was held responsible for the neglect that Jed to that disaster 
in which 20 people died and a hundred others were injured. 
"Our aim," says Rachland, "is to struggle for democracy 
and human rights." It is run by an executive council of 25 
members and produces two publications, Kabar dari Pijar 
(News from Pijar) and Neraca Pembangunan (Development 
Balance Sheet) which circulate on campuses and among the 
NGOs. [Tempo, 15 January, 1994]. 
Criminalising demonstrations 
More than two dozen activists have been arrested for taking part in demonstrations. The army is 
pressing for a new law that would limit the right to protest. Many people are going on trial simply for 
having participated in demonstrations. 
The right to demonstrate is now a major political issue 
following the arrest in Jakarta of 21 people - mostly 
students - during a demonstration outside parliament on 14 
December, and the arrest of 22 people during a demonstra-
tion on 4 January 1994. 
Troops attack demonstrator!i 
The demonstration on 14 December called on the legislative 
assemblies, the MPR-DPR, to convene an extraordinary 
session to dismiss Suharto as President and bring him 
Police brutalitJ at demo on 4 JanuarJ 1994 
before a court to answer for numerous human rights 
violations that have occurred since he seized power. They 
blamed Suharto in particular for the Tanjung Priok massacre 
in September 1984, the Lampung massacre in February 
1989, the mass killings in Aceh since 1989, the recent 
deaths in Madura and West Java, and the Dili massacre in 
November 1991. 
While representatives were inside negotiating for a 
meeting with the chair of the MPR-DPR, the demonstrators 
settled down in the lobby and started enacting drama 
performances and singing songs, without interference from 
the security forces. Then suddenly, without warning, fifty 
anti-riot troops entered the lobby, formed a barricade and 
moved forward, attacking the demonstrators with rubber 
batons and truncheons. Although most people fled, many 
were injured as troops rained blows right and left. Twenty-
one demonstrators were driven away in trucks and are now 
in police custody, awaiting trial. Among those dragged off 
were two women, including Yeni Damayanti, a student at 
the National University, Jakarta. She had just been released 
by the police after being held in connection with an earlier 
demonstration. 
The 4 January demonstration outside the parliament 
building was held to protest against the detention and trial 
of their 21 colleagues on 14 December, along with Nuku 
Soleiman, leader of Yayasan Pijar, who has gone on trial in 
connection with stickers that were distributed during an 
earlier demonstration in Jakarta (see separate item). On this 
occasion, 22 people were arrested and taken to various 
police commands in Jakarta. 
Nationwide protest campaign 
The 14 December arrests provoked anger in many campuses 
across the country. There were protest demonstrations in 
Yogyakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Malang and Surabaya in 
Java, Mataram in Lombok and Denpasar in Bali. The styles 
were varied and very resourceful. 
In Surabaya, demonstrations were held on three consecu-
tive days, each one larger than on the previous day. Those 
participating sang songs and recited poems critical of the 
regime. In Bandung, students focused their actions on the 
local legislative assembly (DPRD), calling on legislators to 
defend the right of people to meet members of parliament. 
In one of their actions, they entered the DPRD building 
where they immediately unfurled a banner calling for an 
end to the army's security approach. 
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Protest was also expressed through a petition launched by 
Yayasan Pi.jar which quickly won the support of a thousand 
signatories in more than a dozen cities throughout the 
country. "As Indonesian citizens, we are aware that expres-
sing opinions is the right of every citizen," it said. The 
petition also said that the arrest of people who were trying 
to inform members of parliament of their views runs 
counter to the spirit of democracy and human rights. The 
English-language daily, Jakarta Post called the support for 
the petition 'unprecedented'. It asked in an editorial: "Is Jhis 
a beginning of an expanded alliance of the disenchanted?" 
[Jakarta Post, 15.I.1994] 
Collecting signatures for a petition is a new tactic for 
mobilising public opinion in Indonesia. This first attempt 
won support from many groups, including the Petition-of-
50, dozens of lawyers, intellectuals, artists and some 
politicians who are in leading positions in the two govern-
ment-endorsed political parties, the PDI and the PPP. 
New anti-demonstration law? 
The army is clearly worried about its inability to handle. 
demonstrations and deal with the current upsurge of 
activism without provoking yet more opposition. President 
Suharto and other government officials have warned against 
the danger of 'liberalism' which they seek to portray as the 
new cloak being used by communists. 
To grapple with the present upsurge which some people 
are comparing to the student unrest in the 1970s, the army 
is now pushing for the introduction of a law that would 
impose restrictions on the right to demonstrate, making it 
obligatory for a police permit to be obtained. Human rights 
activists argue that such a law would be a setback for 
democratic freedoms. Everyone knows that obtaining 
permits for seminars and other gatherings is a lengthy and 
difficult process, frequently ending in refusal. It would be 
virtually impossible to obtain permits for demonstr~t~flOS 
which the authorities would invariably brand as pohbcal. 
Most demonstrations take place spontaneously, at. short 
notice. "One argument for introdueing such a law ts .that 
demonstrations disrupt the public order. But demonstratmns 
by students or workers never do this. Th~. fact is th~~· 
demonstrations annoy the government for pohttcal reasons, 
wrote Mokhtar Pakpahan, leader of the independent trade 
union, SBSI. [Forum Keadilan, 20.I.1994] 
The charges 
Press reports quote the police as saying that all the 21 
people arrested at the 14 December demonstration will be 
tried on charges of 'insulting the President'. Contacts in 
Jakarta believe that the public prosecutor may decide not to 
press such a charge, as this would give all the defendants 
the opportunity, in their defence pleas, to highlight their 
own charges against Suharto. A team of 49 lawyers from 
the LBH and the Bar Association (Ikadin) has been set up 
to defend the 21. No date has yet been set for the trials. 
As for the 22 arrested on 4 January, the authorities turned 
to a law that has not been used for many years. Six of them 
were charged under Article 510 of the Criminal Code. the 
other 14 were released. Article 510 criminalises people for 
involvement in any public event, without police permission, 
that causes a public disturbance. The maximum penalty is 
two weeks in prison or a fine. The six who were charged 
were sentenced to two days or a fine of Rp. 10,000. 
Several lawyers from the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) have 
raised strong objections to the charge. Abdul Hakim Garuda 
Nusantara said: "If the authorities start using Article 510, 
peasants and workers will no longer be able to register their 
complaints with parliament. They will be punishable under 
this law, meaniug that such activities are being crimi-
najised." [Kompas, 7.I.1994] 
According to LBH director, Adnan Buyung Nasution, this 
article was part of Dutch colonial law enacted to prevent 
Indonesians from expressing their aspirations collectively. 
Thirteen PNG villagers killed 
Reports of the killing of villagers on "6th sill.es of the PNG-lndonesilin bt»:ilu la8t 
alarmed human rights activists in both coUlltries. They also suggest tlJlit buftnesu· Ul.\:jllj 
along the border is quite intense, despite lac'k of hard informatio11 t WSJ"[tUllfl 
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GSP and Indonesian labour practices 
The visit of US Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen to Jakarta pushed the issue of labour practices to 
the forefront again. On 15 February, a decision is expected from the Clinton Administration on whether 
to continue or suspend Indonesia's trade benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
which depends on whether Jakarta improves its labour record. As the date for the decision approaches, 
the signs are that the trade benefits will not be withdrawn. 
1994 started with a busy schedule in Washington-Jakarta 
relations. In January a team of US congressmen led by 
Richard Gephardt, a Democrat leader in the US House of 
Representatives, arrived in Jakarta. Five days later a group 
of US Senators arrived in Jakarta, led by Senator J. Bennett 
Johnston. Both visits preceded Lloyd Bentsen's visit to 
Suharto on 16 January. From the press, it was clear that the 
GSP issue was high on the agenda. The GSP system grants 
tariff cuts and quota increases to developing countries to 
encourage their exports. Indonesia's shoe and textile 
industry has been greatly boosted by the GSP system with 
duty free status for US$650 million in Indonesian exports. 
The US Treasury Secretary was the first senior Clinton 
administration official to visit Jakarta. After his meeting 
with President Suharto and Finance Minister Marie Muha-
mmad, Bentsen said he had called on the Indonesian 
government to improve human rights, including its treat-
ment of workers, if it hopes for an extension of US trade 
privileges. US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor voiced 
similar concerns on the lack of labour rights in Indonesia 
(see TAPOL Bulletin no. 117 and 119] and threatened last 
August to withdraw the GSP privileges. Bentsen was 
promised a report by the Indonesian government on 
improved labour conditions. 
New broom? 
Although Jakarta-Washington relations have been relatively 
smooth, in the last few years East Timor and human rights, 
including the GSP issue, have rocked the boat. The new 
Indonesian ambassador in Washington, Arifin Siregar, was 
chosen by Suharto to improve relations. A former banker 
and trade minister, Arifm Siregar is expected to strengthen 
ties with US business and is more personable than his 
predecessors, who were mostly three-star generals. Siregar 
admits that the East Timor issue is still haunting US-
Indonesia relations and adds that they now face the Fein-
gold amendment (on linking arms sales to human rights). 
He is worried about Indonesia's bad image in the US press 
which sees Indonesia as a gross violator (original in Eng-
lish) of human rights. But he is not very optimistic: " ..... I'm 
very cautious because I don't know yet what the results of 
the GSP affair will be. In my opinion, this is a determining 
factor. Hopeful.ly it can be resolved in a good way. But this 
doesn't mean that everything will go smoothly. The fact is 
that the issue of East Timor will continue to haunt us". 
[Tempo,8 January 1994]. 
Frantic home-work 
At first, the GSP threat was disregarded by Jakarta and seen 
as a misunderstanding between the two countries, but in the 
last few months Jakarta has comprehended the seriousness 
of the matter, working very hard to improve things. Three 
major criticisms have occupied the minds of the authorities: 
freedom of association, military intervention in labour 
disputes, and low wages. The government-backed union 
SPSI has been the target of international criticism. As the 
only recognised union, it does nothing to protect workers' 
interests and often functions as a government or corporate 
tool to control the workers. 
Responding to the critics, SPSI was changed from a 
unitary union into a federation with 13 sectoral trade 
unions. While on paper this might impress some peopl~, it 
is only cosmetic. Many SPSI officials are retired military, 
Golkar bureaucrats or even entrepreneurs. Mochtar Pakpah-
an, chair of the non-recognised SBSI union, said the SPSI 
reorganisation would do nothing to improve workers' 
welfare. "It's like putting on a new shirt while the face is 
still ugly" [Jakarta Post, 31-12-1993]. Indonesia is still far 
removed from the fundamental right of freedom of associ-
ation. The history of labour in many countries teaches that 
the workers are bound to organise in independent unions, 
with or without permission. Appalling labour conditions 
will only hasten this. 
The minimum wage 
Another response to the critics has been to raise minimum 
wages. From 1 January, the minimum wage for Jakarta and 
surrounding areas was raised to Rp 3,800 (US$1.80) a day, 
up from Rp 2,600 (US$1.23). While the new rate is far too 
low to meet workers' minimum needs, many employers 
have said they will not to pay the increase. 
The new year started with a wave of strikes. Thousands of 
workers in Jakarta and Tangerang staged protests to demand 
the new rate. In the last few years, different non-govern-
mental organisations {NGOs) have made the workers' plight 
their major area of concern. Research on workers' condi-
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tions has improved greatly and provides a sound basis for 
assisting the workers in their fight for better conditions. 
In a recent seminar on workers' rights the wage issue was 
the main topic. In a study of a Korean-owned shoe factory 
in Tangerang it was revealed that top management salaries 
were 150 to 220 times the wages of the lowest paid 
operators. Another survey in Jember, a major tobacco-
growing region in East Java, compared wages in 1978 and 
1993. In 1978, the rate was Rp 225 an hour, equivalent to 
8 kgs of rice, while the wage in October 1993 rose tenfold 
to Rp 2,250, enough to buy 4.5 kgs of rice. 
The average woman worker in Indonesia needs to work 
much more to buy the same goods than workers in neigh-
bouring countries. Adnan Buyung Nasution, Indonesia's 
best-known human rights lawyer said: "What can a worker 
buy with such a small sum (or) survive in urban areas?" 
[Jakarta Post 31-12-1994). Indonesian officials acknowl-
edge that the minimum wage covers only about 78% of a 
worker's minimum physical requirement. 
Military involvement 
Military involvement in Jabour affairs is structural and has 
been the main obstacle to the emergence of independent 
unions. When in January newspapers carried banner head-
lines reading: "Indonesia bans army action in labour 
disputes", it was as if an earthquake had struck. 
The energetic Manpower Minister announced the lifting 
of three decrees of 1986 and 1988 that were the target of 
Washington's criticism. They allow military intervention in 
Jabour disputes and have blocked the rise of new Jabour 
unions. The new decree also said companies could no 
longer call on the security forces if a labour dispute 
threatens to become violent. 
Indonesian human rights organisations reacte~ ~~th 
cynicism. In August last year they demande~ a JUd1c1al 
review of all the decrees which curb labour nghts. In his 
first reaction Mochtar Pakpahan, SBSI chair, said the new 
decree contains many loopholes, including unclear mechan-
isms for settling labour disputes, and does not apply to state 
enterprises and non-commercial institutions .. The YLBlf l or 
Legal Aid Foundation was even more sceptical. It beheves 
that the step has been taken merely to meet GSP require-
ments, while Bakorstanas, the military security body, is still 
free to step into any political situation, including labour 
strikes. The tragic death of labour activist Marsinah is taken 
as an example of Bakorstanas meddling. The latest strikes 
demanding payment of the new minimum wage have also 
been handled by the military. YLBHI spokesperson Hend-
ardi argues that ministerial decrees are subordinate to the 
unbridled powers of Bakorstanas. 
Strikes at Nike 
The new year also saw the start of a series of mass strikes 
in Jakarta and its industrial suburbs. On 18 January, about 
12,000 workers in Tangerang, west of Jakarta, staged a 
strike. In the last decade Tangerang has become a boom 
city of manufacturing. It displays aJJ the ugly features of 
rapid development - factories sprawling in all directions, 
shabby housing complexes hastily erected everywhere and 
dreadful pollution. Tangerang is also the location of the 
leisure shoe company Nike which produces 1 to 1.2 million 
pair of shoes a month in Indonesia. Two sister companies 
of Nike, PT Hasi and PT NASA (Nagasakti Paramashoes 
Industry) produce 12-15% of Nike's global output. This 
time PT NASA was hit when the entire work force of 8,000 
workers downed tools. The company has 10 assembly lines 
and produces half a million Nike shoes a month. 
Tightening the belt 
Economics is hardly an exact science and forecasts about 1994 vary greatly. Some economists predict 
another year of robust economic expansion for Indonesia while others paint a more gloomy picture. 
Suharto's New Year budget speech reflected a bare-bones budget, suggesting some lean years ahead. 
Despite Indonesia's respectable macro-economic growth of 
6.5% in 1993, the near future doesn't look as bright as it 
seems. The boom years of the eighties have come to a halt 
and the world recession is also biting deep into the 
Indonesian economy. Bad bank debts and the collapse of 
several prominent conglomerates are typical results of the 
casino economy of the Reagan/Thatcher era. 
Other major stumbling blocks are: the sluggish world 
market prices of oil and gas, the foreign debt service 
repayments, falling foreign investments and the huge 
unemployment figures. All give sleepless nights for the top 
Indonesian technocrats. 
Suharto's 1994/1995 draft budget reflects austerity and 
implies a contraction of economic activities, not least 
because more than 40% of the recurrent routine spending 
will go for foreign debt service payments. The president is 
urging government officials to improve their budget 
discipline and efficiency. The almost mythical figure of 
30% is frequently used by senior officials to indicate 
rampant corruption, leaks and inefficiency by the huge 
bureaucracy. The new budget anticipates much higher state 8,000 workers at PT Nasa, the Nike shoe factory, went on strike for three days in January. 
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revenue from taxes (VAT and income-tax), a logical step 
with the number of the affluent people growing. 
Oil and gas prices 
The budget still uses the oil price of US$ 16 a barrel, while 
the spot price in January plummeted to US$13. This will 
create a gap of almost US$1 billion in revenue which can 
only be filled by more tax-earnings and an increase in 
exports by the non-oil sector. Oil and gas now account for 
only 21.5% of domestic income. 
The government is determined to keep economic growth 
between 6 and 7% and by the year 2000 the government 
target is US$1000 for average income per annum. In 
comparison, neighbouring Malaysia has reached a per capita 
income of US$ 3000. 
At present, Suharto's goal is threatened by several factors, 
in particular falling investments and the growing rate of 
unemployment. 
Sluggish foreign investments 
The global recession and in particular near-zero growth in 
Japan has led to stagnation in the whole region, including 
Indonesia. Foreign investments in Indonesia in 1993 fell by 
21.3% in comparison with the year before. In 1992 US$ 
10.3 billion was invested and in 1993 foreign investments 
stood at US$ 8 billion. Singapore has overtaken Japan as 
the biggest investor by putting US$1.33 billion into the 
Indonesian economy, while Japan in the second place 
invested US$ million with South Korea in third place with 
US$660 million. Economists argue that the drop in foreign 
investments is the result of a sluggish global economy but 
also of greener pastures for foreign investments in countries 
like China, India and Vietnam. 
Bad bank debts 
The new Governor of Bank Indonesia, Sudradjat Djiwan-
dono, recently announced tougher measures for the domes-
tic banking industry. According to his figures bad and 
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doubtful debts account for 15.2% of total bank credits of 
169 trillion (US$ 85 billion), up from 7.4% in 1988. Bad 
debts total 3.3% of total credits, says the Central Bank. The 
economist Kwik Kian Gie puts the figure much higher; his 
estimate is as high as 8%. Many businesses can't handle 
their debts anymore. Figures mentioned in financial circles 
suggest that between 40 and 50% of state bank loans and 
20 to 25% of private loans are uncollectable in the short 
term. Sudradjat Djiwandono said that in an effort to 
improve bad debt recovery through the legal system, the 
Bank Indonesia had intensive discussions with the justice 
department, the attorney-general and other institutions. 
Unemolovment fi211res 
Indonesia, with the fourth largest population in the world, 
has a frightening population situation. By the year 2000, the 
island of Java will be inhabited by 120 million people, 
while every year 3 million people enter the labour market. 
Abdul Latief, the Manpower Minister, stunned the public 
when he announced that unemployment is as high as 38%; 
last year, the official was a ludicrous 2 to 3%. It later 
emerged that the minister's figure includes the under-
employed. However close his figure is to the real situation, 
the statement helped to focus attention on this serious 
matter. 
It is estimated that about 29 million people are without 
full-time jobs, the first public acknowledgement of this 
grave issue. The absence of any social security net forces 
people to seek a living in the informal sector and to 
function in the margins of the economy. Official figures 
reveal that efforts to create new jobs are not enough to 
absorb the new entrants to the labour market. Unless the 
Indonesian government introduces drastic policy changes, 
the unemployment situation could become a time bomb. 
UK-INDONES&i~l1EL4TIONS 
The cosy Jakarta-London relations 
~ile. the int~rnational ~omm~nity_ is now m?ving towards adopting human rights conduct as a 
criterion for aid, London is moving in the opposite direction, providing aid as a way to win arms deals. 
The World Develop"!ent Movement calls UK aid 'a sweetener' for landing lucrative arms deals. The 
examples of Mala>:sia,. Jordan, Oman and Indonesia are cited. Indonesia, never part of the British 
Empire, has seen its aid from the UK rise by 196% since 1980, as the arms trade has mounted. 
The coming and going of British and Indonesian ministers 
between Jakarta and London is an example of the cosy 
relations (see also Tapol Bulletin no. 118, August 1993). 
Kenneth Clarke, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer 
paid a five-day visit to Indonesia early this year to offer 
financial services, ie. privatisation expertise, and explore the 
possibilities of more British investments in Indonesia. 
In his address to Indonesian policy makers and business-
men, Clarke said: "Indonesia's public enterprises sector 
remains large but we are watching with great interest the 
steps you are taking to speed up privatisation by setting up 
holding companies to coordinate the process". While the 
Japanese flow of banking credits to Indonesia has grown 
sluggish, Clarke is looking for openings for British banks 
and said British financiers can help Jakarta obtain offshore 
capital loans at acceptable costs, as well as provide man-
agement know-how for the embryonic Indonesian stock 
exchange. 
Oleh-oleh dari London 
In December, when Britain's Chief of Air Staff Air 
Marshall visited Jakarta, it was revealed that the Indo~esian 
air force has been given the green light to open negotiations 
with British Aerospace (BAe) to purchase another 16 Hawk 
aircraft. A few months earlier BAe managed to clinch a 500 
million sterling deal from AURI for 24 Hawk trainers and 
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ground-attack fighters. The new deal involves Hawk 200 
Series single-~at fighters with fittings for Maverick air-
to-ground missiles. 
On 25 November, Minister Rudy Habibie paid one of his 
many visits to BAe in London when he signed a number of 
a~eements with the ailing :flagship of British industry. The 
agreements came to light when Habibie reported to a 
parliamentary commission. Habibie, Indonesia's high-tech 
czar, has plans to develop a cheap people's car which is 
energy-saving. While the design and body will be 
Indonesian, they will be fitted with Rover 1.1 litrc K-series 
engines. Rover is part of the BAe empire. 
Picket-line at the Stevenage BAe factory, April 1993 
After the Taiwan BAe deal fell through, it became almost 
inevitable that IPTN (the Indonesian aerospace industry) 
and BAe would close ranks. The 25 November preliminary 
agreement points in that direction. IP'IN is planning to 
launch its 70-seater N-250 turboprop plane in 1995. BAe 
has promised not only to help to promote the N-250, but 
also to assist in acquiring a European certificate for the 
plane. Discussions about a po~ible joint venture between 
the IP'IN N-250 and the BAe Jetstream turboprop were 
also on the agenda. Oleh-oleh (souvenirs) from London is 
certainly what Habibie took home to Jakarta. 
UK, Indonesia's gateway to Europe 
UK Trade Minister Richard Needham, a frequent visitor to 
Indonesia, took a 20-strong trade delegation last December. 
He offered the UK as Indonesia's gateway to European 
markets. The UK's total investment in Indonesia, including 
oil projects, totals two billion dollars, making it the largest 
European investor in the past two years. Speaking to a 
business lunch organised by Warta Ekonomi he made a 
pledge to double trade with Indonesia within two or three 
years. Needham and Habibie signed a MOU on the cooper-
ative establishment of an engine laboratory for thermody-
namics, engines and propulsion systems. During his visit 
Richard Needham also explored the po~ibilities of Brit~ 
projects in the development of infrastructural w~rks like 
airports, harbours and public transport systems like sub-
ways. · 
Shopping for arms in Euro~e 
Clinton's committment to human nghts, although 1:-rgely 
rhetorical has caused irritation in Jakarta. In particular, 
military 'circles are deeply off ended and missions to 
European countries like Britain, France and Germany have 
been sent to explore arms deals. Defence Minister General 
Edi Sudradjat said last September that Indonesia would buy 
defence equipment from Europe, if . US arms . sales are 
linked to human rights, particularly m East . Timor. The 
Indonesian army is looking to Europe for h~t armour, 
artillery equipment and armoured personnel earners. 
In recession-ridden countries like the UK, arms exports 
are becoming the foundation for jobs and prosperity. The 
scandals surrounding the sale of arms to Iraq, now under 
investigation by the Scott inquiry, and the huge row that 
has broken out about the UK's funding of Malaysia's Pergau 
dam project which was, unla~lly, lll_iked to Bri_tis? arms 
sales, has only reinforced the impression that this IS how 
John Major's government operates these days. 
Continued from p. 20 
There are many sides to this book. Rich in description of 
exotic landscapes by a master of English prose, it is 
punctuated by outbursts against the realities of Suharto's 
Indonesia with its brutal attempt to remould people to a 
standardised pattern. There is plenty of wit in its comment 
on the agents of this State-led social engineering. As with 
so many of Lewis's books, this is a vivid snap-shot of 
people and environments under pressure to change, 
succumbing and resisting with dignity. 
Many who may want to read it will be put off by the 
price of this hard-back edition. But be assured; the 
paperback version can't be too far off. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
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Nepotism, Indonesian style 
Having a famous father (or mother) can be useful for one's career anywhere, b~~ in Asia nepotism ha_s 
become the fashion. Sons, daughters or wives are taking over as rulers and poltttcal leaders from their 
deceased fathers/husbands. As Asian societies modernise, family-favouritism has become rampant. The 
''Asian disease" has now hit Jakarta. "Tutut for President" has become a hot political potato. 
The emergence of Tutut Suharto and Megawati Sukarno at 
the pinnacle of the political elite was in many ways to be 
expected. The lack of genuine democratic structures in 
Indonesia, which applies to many other Asian countries, 
helps pave the way for family dynasties. 
Megawati and the PDI 
Megawati, the late president's oldest daughter, has been in 
politics for quite some time and was reelected to parliament 
last year. Her parliamentary colleagues consider her a quiet, 
low-profile or even lazy MP. She is mild-mannered, 
modest in her dress, and not a high-flyer in politics. This 
changed in late 1993 when for the umpteenth time a crisis 
engulfed the POI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). Overnight 
Megawati became the darling of the press and the hottest 
issue in town when she was chosen to lead the party. 
The POI, a loose, forced alliance of nationalist and 
Christian parties, although popular among the urban youth, 
has never played (has not been allowed to play) an import-
ant role. Its role is purely cosmetic. The 1987 elections saw 
a flirtation between the POI leadership and senior generals 
in the armed forces (ABRI). This carried over to the 1992 
elections though the alliance was never formal. Suryadi, the 
POI chairman for 1988-1993 is a close associate of Gen-
eral Benny Murdani's. The deadlock at its congress in 1988 
was 'resolved' by top-level army intervention and Suryadi 
was appointed with ABRI's blessing. 
The Suharto-Murdani conflict intensified and in 1993, 
Suharto removed Murdani from the cabinet. This signalled 
the end of Suryadi's career as a politician but he managed, 
by controlling the party bureaucracy, to be 'democratically' 
re-elected at the POI congress in mid-1993. But in Jakarta, 
Suharto and his cronies annulled the decision. This left POI 
bereft of a chairman and the government convened a 
special congress in December 1993 in Surabaya. Home 
Minister, ret'd Lt. General Yogie Memet had the job of 
installing a government loyalist. 
Rekayasa or arus bawah? 
Government reko.yasa (social engineering) seemed to be 
working. POI provincial branch delegates were handpicked 
by the authorities to ensure the election of Budi Hardjono, 
an obscure politician. 
But unexpectedly, Megawati emerged as candidate for the 
chair and her election soon became unstoppable. Branches 
overwhelmingly gave her their support and the government 
scheme fell to pieces. Yogie Memet and local bureaucrats 
tried to arm-twist the POI branches, but in vain. Most 
delegates had promised to support Budi but in Surabaya, 
switched their support to Megawati. 
Some political analysts, in their enthusiasm, started 
talking about the victory of arus bawah (grass-roots or 
people's power). The regime's efforts to out-manoeuvre 
Megawati had crumbled. 
The special Surabaya congress cost the government Rp 
900 million but gave Megawati a convincing victory. The 
results were again annulled. Not to be outdone, Yogie 
Memet convened yet another POI meeting in Jakarta. It 
was now clear that Mega's position was unassailable and 
gradually government stalwarts changed positions, support-
ing her as chair. 
The powerful Minister, Habibie gave her his backing as 
did the Suharto kids, Tutut and Bambang Suharto. So 
within days Bina Graha gave Mega the green light. Yogie 
Memet, who had had the thankless task of preventing 
Mega's nomination, grudgingly accepted defeat. His 
meeting with Megawati became front page news, with 
everyone full of smiles 
To argue that this happened because of arus bawah is to 
give too much credit to this interesting political event. But 
it is unprecedented for Megawati and the POI rank-and-
file to have disregarded government pressure and reko.yasa. 
It does not mean that reko.yasa did not occur. According to 
former Vice-President Sudharmono, the POI congress in 
Medan chose Suryadi but when he failed to get government 
blessing, Mega became the rallying point, a clear example 
of reko.yasa. 
The role of DAIS 
In the eighties, friction emerged between Murdani and 
Suharto over Golko.r, the ruling party which had became 
Suharto's vehicle. As things worsened, Murdani backed the 
POI as a way to nibble at Golka.r's monopoly. Suryadi was 
a Benny man; after being ousted from the chair, he backed 
Megawati in Surabaya. 
Officially Benny Murdani hoJds no positions and rejected 
an ambassadorial post. In Suharto's Indonesia, people out 
of office are usually toothless but Benny Murdani is an 
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exception. As an intelligence operator he still influences 
many inte1ligence officers in pivotal positions in ABRI and 
the administration. 
It was Murdani who founded BAIS, Badan Intelijens 
Strategis, the Strategic Intelligence Body, which he headed 
for many years. Even after he stopped being Defence 
Minister, BAIS remained virtually intact. The BAIS Mega-
wati operation was initiated by Murdani himself, who 
called ABRI HQ urging that they back Sukarno's daughter. 
The task was carried out mainly by Major-General Hen-
dropriyono, a former BAIS deputy chief, and his successor 
in BAIS, Major-General Agum Gumelar. Political circles 
say Megawati promised the military that she would not to 
promote Sukarnoism. Sukarnoism means different things to 
different people but in the sixties it meant the inclusion of 
communists in the national front. She also told them the 
PDI would back the ABRI candidate, should Suharto step 
down in 1998. 
After three costly PDI conferences, Megawati Sukarno 
was finally installed. An odd combination of arus bawah 
and rekayasa. 
Mbak Tutut, a household name. 
While Mbak Mega's political ambitions are modest, Mbak 
Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, to give her her full name) 
has higher ambitions. Previously known for her social 
work, chairing an array of foundations, Tutut has recently 
become a successful businesswoman. Her flagship company 
PT Citra Lamtoro Gung has diversified into practically all 
fields of business: from tradecraft to road-building, from 
import-export to banking, more than 30 companies. 
But now, Tutut has become a big name in domestic 
politics. She was appointed vice-chair of Golkar, the 
government party and is also a member of parliament. She 
attends a dazzling array of events: social gatherings, 
signing multi-milion contracts, meeting in parliament. 
Megawati's victory threatened Tutut's high profile so she 
visited the grave of President Sukarno, and invited Mega-
wati to visit her, which became the event of the day. 
Tutut, surrogate foreign minister 
The only gap in Tutut's activities is foreign affairs so she 
has been working hard to fill it. She unexpectedly appeared 
in London to meet the participants at the 'reconciliation' 
talks between Timorese. In January she became chair of the 
Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association. East Timor 
continues to haunt every Indonesian diplomat and by 
involving herself in the issue, Tutut has guaranteed herself 
frequent media attention. It is now being said that she may 
attend the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 
February. 
The succession 
The rift between Suharto and large sections of ABRI has 
brought the succession issue to the fore. There are two 
likely candidates, ret'd General Try Sutrisno, now Vice-
President, and Minister Habibie who enjoys support from 
large sections of the business community, the bureaucracy 
and Muslims. Although both are close to Suharto, the 
ageing president has never given any hint about a likely 
successor. Still worse, he has shown his dissatisfaction with 
Try Sutrisno. While Try Jacks brains and subtlety, Habibie 
is charming and charismatic. As the most powerful person 
A gushing Tutut Suharto (right) summoned a demure Megawati 
Sukarno for a photo opportunity. 
(after Suharto, of course), he has made coalitions with 
many groups, even including Suharto's critics, Not necess-
arily all Habibie's moves have the blessing of the palace. 
As with any dictator reaching the end of his reign, the 
most worrying factor is, how to step down gracefuUy while 
protecting his wealth and personal safety. If he doesn't feel 
safe with either man, his eldest daughter Tutut, could be 
the best choice. 
STOP PRE&S 
A major shake-up has taken place in the top echelons of 
ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces. While at the time of 
writing, the reshuffle is not complete, some important 
trends can be noted. BAIS, the major intelligence agency, 
is being totally overhauled. Set up as a monitoring agency, 
BAIS became extremely powerful. With the removal of 
General Benny Murdani, the founding father of BAIS, from 
governmment, it was expected that Suharto would 
reorganise the intelligence agency which has always been 
seen as Murdani's network. The new unit will be called 
BIA (Badan Intelijens ABRI, ABRI Intelligence Board) and 
will be reduced in size, with 5 instead of 8 directorates. 
BAIS was formerly under theABR/ Commander-in-Chief 
and had a direct line of command to Kopassus, the notori-
ous red berets. BAIS has been deeply involved in 'trouble 
spots' like East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and the 
handling of land conflicts. The Megawati operation, 
described above, was a typical BAIS operation. Bina 
Graha (Suharto's office) now argues that the upsurge of 
protest (students, workers and peasants) signals the failure 
of this intelligence agency. 
Details of the new structure of BIA are unavailable but it 
is certain that it will not have the operational clout of its 
predecessor and its line of command will be lower down in 
the armed forces hierarchy. And what is also certain is that 
the era of de-Benny (Murdani)-isation has begun. 
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Human rights briefs 
GOLPUT activists appeal against verdict 
About 2,000 students from different cities went to Sema-
rang district court to hear the verdict against Luwarso and 
Poltak Ike Wibowo who were tried for calling for an 
election boycott in 1992. At stake is campus freedom in 
general. The students rallied in front of the court building, 
singing, yelling slogans and reading poetry. The security 
forces were present in full force; even Arhanud, air force 
crack troops, were deployed. 
Judge Suwarso sentenced the two to four months which 
created quite some anger among the demonstrators. The 
defence team which incJuded Adnan Buyung Nasution has 
decided to appeal. Puspoadji, chair of the LBH Semarang 
office said: "What the defendants did was quite normal 
within a campus environment". He was referring to a 
satirical art event organised by the students in May 1992 at 
the Diponegoro University campus. 
Universitas Indonesia under fire 
Leading human rights activist and lawyer, Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, was not allowed to address a seminar at Univer-
sitas Indonesia, the state university in Jakarta on the orders 
of the university authorities. Buyung was to have taken part 
in a seminar on Scholars and Human Rights but the 
organisers were informed the night before that his appear-
ance had been cancelled by the acthorities. 
This was the second time in as many weeks that UI had 
silenced people known to have the courage to speak up 
against the situation in Indonesia. The previous target of 
Ul's denial of freedom of speech was the noted poet and 
playwright, W.S. Rendra. 
The Legal Aid Institute, of which Buyung is director, 
bitterly criticised the university not only for trampling on 
freedom of speech but also for bringing itself into disrepute 
as a centre of learning. "The ban at UI has indirectly made 
the academic functions of higher learning institutes impo-
tent," said the Institute. [Jakarta Post, 14.XII.1993) 
How (not to) get a permit 
No seminar, discussion or symposium can take place in 
Indonesia without a police permit, while the process for 
getting the permit is time-consuming, tortuous and often 
unsuccessful. 
The procedure requires organisers of such events to apply 
first to the police, then go to the directorate for social-
political affairs (a division of the interior ministry or local 
government adminstration usually under military direction), 
the social affairs office and the army's stability agency, 
Bakorstanas(da) and thereafter back to the police. At each 
stage, forms have to be filled in and 'inducements' given to 
the officials. All this can take up to a month; in many 
cases, the permit is issued only an hour or two before the 
event is due to begin, or is refused. By this time, everything 
has been set in place, participants have been invited 
(sometimes having travelled long distances), food and drink 
ordered and other costs defrayed. 
All this hassle, so often to no avail, means that activities 
of this nature have become too risky to undertake, 'which is 
a serious setback for political and academic debate. [See 
Mulya Lubis, "Our society has tooth-ache", in Forum 
Keadilan 23.Xll.1993) 
Buyung turns down meeting with Dutch MPs 
Adnan Buyung Nasution refused to attend a meeting with 
a group of Dutch MPs headed by the Speaker, saying the 
meeting would be of no value in improving human rights. 
He also rejected the meeting because it would have been in 
private {he used the word clandestine) with very few people 
attending. Activists from other NGOs should also have been 
invited, Buyung insisted. 
Buyung said that initially he was invited by the Dutch 
ambassador to have lunch with the MPs in Hotel Indonesia 
together with Marzuki Darusman, deputy-chair of the 
National Human Rights Commission, Mochtar Pakpahan, of 
the independent trade union SBSI, and T. Mulya Lubis, 
Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights. 
Buyung regretted that the Dutch parliamentarians had 
wanted a clandestine meeting with NGO activists. Such 
matters should be discussed out in the open, he said. 
[Media Indonesia, 14.I.1994) 
The Dutch MPs visit has also been criticised by human 
rights groups in the Netherlands. It was a very high profile 
mission composed of the leaders of all the main party 
groups in parliament. The itinerary was set by the 
Indonesian parliament and only one hour was allowed for 
contact with human rights organisations. Previous Dutch 
parliamentary visits have invariably given a high profile to 
human rights concerns. East Timor was not on the agenda 
at all 
The mission was sent in preparation for a visit to Indo-
nesia of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Foreign Minister 
Pieter Kooijmans. This will later be followed by a state 
visit by the Dutch Queen. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, IJJ.1994. 
NEWS ITEM: BURMESE STRONGMAN KHIN NYUNT WANTS TO COPY WHAT HE 
CONSIDERS INDONESIA'S MILITARY-DOMINATED POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
ET/OT markings to be scrapped? 
Armed forces commander-in-chief General Faisal Tanjung 
told a parliamentary commission recently that the govern-
ment may soon abandon the policy of marking the identity 
cards of former political prisoners alleged to have been 
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members of the PK.I as well as those of their relatives, with 
'ET' (for 'ex-tapol') or 'OT' (for organisasi terlarang, or 
banned organisation). The policy is based on an Interior 
Ministry regulation of 1981 saying that such markings are 
needed for purposes of control; relatives can apply to have 
the marking removed provided they can prove their loyalty 
to Pancasila and the Indonesian state and government. 
The difficulties created by these markings are widely-
known. The widow of a former PK.I politbureau member 
said recently that even to pay a visit to her family in Solo, 
she had to apply for a permit. When she wants to move 
house, she needs the approval of the security agency, 
Bakorstanas, which involves her in lengthy formalities. 
Joebar Ajoeb, the former secretary-general of the leftwing 
cultural organisation, LEK.RA, which was banned in 1965, 
is still required to report at least monthly to the local army 
command. 
An official of the Interior Minister would not say whether 
the 1981 policy was about to be abandoned. "We're study-
ing it," he said. [Forum Keadilan, 6.I.1994) 
The never-ending story of HKBP 
For the state and army to intervene in an internal religious 
conflict is asking for trouble. The conflict in the Toba 
Batak church, HKBP, the largest Protestant congregation in 
Indonesia, has gone from bad to worse. The authorities' use 
of gangster methods has only infuriated the followers of 
Reverend Nababan who was forced to resign as HKBP 
leader. They have been physically attacked by hired thugs. 
Sabam Siburian, a Medan lawyer, was attacked by four men 
and struck in the forehead and arm with a machete, barely 
surviving the attack. A similar atrocity happened to Raya 
Butar Butar who was knifed and beaten with wooden bars. 
During an attack on the home of T.M.R. Simbolon, con-
siderable damage was done to his house. 
The government-backed HKBP wing led by Rev. Siman-
juntak is using Pemuda Pancasila, a notorious youth 
organisation to gain an edge over the Nababan group. This 
youth group, with branches in all the major cities, Jives 
from extortion and other Mafia-like practices. It enjoys the 
protection of the local military or, worse, often works hand 
in hand with them. Although Simanjuntak has the backing 
of the authorities, the vast majority of HKBP congregants 
(including the ministers) support Nababan. Most church 
buildings and land are in the hands of Nababan followers. 
Now the Simanjuntak wing is using violence to seize 
control over these properties. But Nababan foJJowers have 
not stood idle. More than 2,000 people attacked the HKBP 
foundation office in Medan and went on the rampage. The 
building along with documents and files were destroyed. A 
dormitory at the adjacent Nommensen University was also 
destroyed. The Dean, previously on Nababan's side had just 
been replaced by Rev. Simanjuntak so a dash occurred 
between the security forces and the Nababan congregation. 
Reviewing Sanusi' s case 
Haji Mohammad Sanusi, 73 years old, is the victim of one 
of the most tragic cases in Indonesian legal history. A 
former Cabinet minister and MP, he was a leading member 
of the Petisi 50 dissident group and a vocal critic of 
government. As a key defendant, he became the fall guy in 
the Muslim trials of the early eighties. 
He was tried twice. In 1985, he got 19 years for alleged 
involvement with an explosion at a bank. In 1986 he got 20 
years for plotting to topple the government and an alleged 
a~assination attempt against the president. These charges 
were pivotal in giving substance to regime accusations 
about the terrorist activities of Muslim defendants and 
proving that there had been a grand scheme to plot against 
the state. But the evidence against Sanusi was flimsy to say 
the least. 
In May 1993, the Supreme Court annulled the s~cond 
sentence on the grounds that the defendant was serving a 
similar maximum sentence for another offence. In Novem-
ber, his lawyer Muhammad Dault asked for another judicial 
review. The lawyer now argus that Sanusi's trial was 
political and present circumstances today are different than 
they were then. Key witnesses against him have now 
retracted their testimonies. Rachmat Basuki, recently 
released, who was given 17 years, now admits that his 
incriminating testimony was given under duress and torture. 
The Sanusi trial was arguably the most draconian political 
trial of the era. Justice demands that he should be released 
immediately. [Forum Keadilan, 6.I.1994) 
Lawyer condemns abuses in West Papua 
The human rights situation is far worse in Irian Jaya (West 
Papua) than in Java. People there are easily accused of 
being 'separatists' and detained without trial, said Bambang 
Widjajanto who recently won the 1993 Robert Kennedy 
Award for his activities in defence of the indigenous people 
of the region. The indigenous people are terrified of local 
military officers who use threats of OPM involvement to 
obtain bribes from them. 
He told a gathering of activists meeting to celebrate his 
award that greater attention should be paid to Irian Jaya. He 
said that miliW}' checkpoints were Jocated everywhere 
outside the provincial capital and spoke in particular about 
the damaging impact of Freeport mining activities. [Jakarta 
Post, 16.XII.1994). 
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Jakarta bas to recognise its political incapacity on the 
ground of complex political struggle." 
He made an attack on those who participated in "what the 
enemy pretends to call reconciliation, this secret meeting 
which will be held in the UK.... It is a pity that some 
Timorese abroad are only able to play the games of the 
enemy. Those who are abroad do not know the character of 
the enemy, they do not know what we know about the 
enemy." His message ended with the words: 
l wish to appeal and urge all leaders of the clandestine 
front to enjoy many successes in the struggle of our people 
in 1994. 
The truth about his trial 
In a letter to the Geneva-based International Commission 
of Jurists, Xanana explained at some length how he was 
prevented from appointing lawyers of the Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH) and forced to use a lawyer named Sudjono 
who was introduced to him by Major-General Hendropri-
yono, who was then an intelligence officer in BAIS. 
Hendropriyono is now military commander of Jakarta. The 
lawyer remained in close contact with the army at every 
stage of his trial. Xanana also insists that it was never his 
intention to ask for clemency from Suharto. "It went against 
my principles to ask for a reduction of sentence as I did not 
accept any sentence," he wrote. 
The letter concludes with an appeal to the [CJ and all 
international bodies connected with international law to 
launch a protest and campaign for annulment of his trial 
process. He also asked for intervention in his case of a 
Portuguese lawyer who should be assisted by LBH lawyers, 
in order to facilitate communication. 
Response by the LBH 
Xanana also wrote to the LBH explaining how he had been 
prevented from making contact before the trial. He has now 
broken completely with Sudjono and asked the LBH to 
provide him with a lawyer "in view of my status as a 
convicted person, as regards the Indonesian legal aspects" 
and to ensure that the lawyer would visit him periodically. 
The contents of Xanana's letter to the LBH were made 
public in a statement on 17 January in which the LBH 
announced that it has appointed three lawyers "to meet him 
and find out what precisely happened to him and what he 
now wants". The lawyers are: Adnan Buyung Nasution, 
Frans Winarta and Luhut Pangaribuan. 
On 20 January, they asked the Director of Prisons at the 
Justice Ministry, Baharuddin Lopa, to allow them to meet 
their client. It was Lopa who took the decision earlier this 
month to withdraw Xanana's visiting rights, violating his 
rights under Indonesian law and according to international-
ly-accepted principles. Lopa, a professor of law, was 
recently named Secretary of the official Human Rights 
Commission set up last year by presidential decree. 
Another of Xanana's moves was to write to President 
Suharto. He said he had accepted full responsibility for 
everything done by the resistance up to the time of his 
capture on 20 November 1992. Referring to East Timorese 
now in prison for having carried out activities under his 
command and in connection with his own capture, he said 
it was "logical and legally plausible" for them to be 
released unconditionally "in exchange for an even heavier 
sentence against myself'. 
Xanana also appealed to Suharto for "a greater willingness 
for dialogue regarding the case of East Timor". 
Sleep deprivation 
"'. ' kftJr:' t~ the Portugu~~ , solidarity movement 
Written in Cipinang Prison in November, Xanana 
... ·. ····· that when be was in captivity in Denpasar, 
.as taken the day af!er he was captured, he 
. ··· · to prolonged ·Sleep deprivation. 
:liowdear that .·this was how army intelligence 
to ··· · 1Us ,$pirit butihe decided · upon bis 
td~gg(~ ttfe rig@ moment to defeat .. tbe · 
·····•.... ~n) I was in the mili!ary police -prison in 
'' IJ6ymsar, four cir five guanliivere posted in front- of 
. my cell. They did not stop making a noise ... , looking 
at me; watching my every move. I was handcuffed. · 
lJJu they did not wa1JI me to f?e- able to think. I wqs 
· <'unable to sleep for three conse(:Ulive days and nights, · 
fWenty-four hours a day. 
!.: 'c~I was .. exhausted, totally exhausted. Fatigue 
·i;;>WeigMdm~; (lown. ·/would pick.up foodjust to settle 
my stomach. tsmokid. It was O,llplanntid. At around 
midnight, they would start ca.lling out, 'Have you 
i:d?' I felt like spitting in their faces. 
rStUdied. their qtiestions, their aims. lstudied w/*.at 
i(:was they wanted. J cried a JO!- I cried in order to 
. act. I knew that ii was temporarily a wily for me to 
· · ;able to defeat the enemy, to; unmask him. at a later 
,qge. But it was hardfor me ·to do, extremely hard. 
/decided not to row against the stream, . not because 
· afraid of beUig touched - I knew I would not 
was tix> 'impqrtanl' for them. I ~·too va4lable 
· ... e for them. Iliad to be; treate4 with . kindness, · 
IJ8 their" compatriots usually ore. 
.. >'Al night, whenever / was able to think for a few 
.. · ..· ......... ·· . nts <jiUl while they were'kmglaing wjih satiafa.c." 
.·.···.· r!.; belieVing they_ had achieved victory, I WOUid· 
. recapitulate .· the steps, summar.isiag every point. R . 
.;iH~fow atJast, his apparent a~ptance ~f inte8ratioa . · 
' l>efore the television cameras ·can be· placed in con- -
;~.His mental powers ~md : ~pirit to .resist .remained. 
-intact during this harsh psychological-torture .which 
. he'tumed to his own advantage, 
Continued from p. 15 
Tutut's special role on East Timor suggests that Suharto 
needs his own framework to resolve the question of East 
Timor which continues to dog his attempts to shape a more 
prominent role for Indonesia and for himself on the 
international arena. In East Timor itself, Tutut's forays into 
'social' good-works have won her no friends. Nor is the 
international community likely to be impressed by all these 
characters now parading as pioneers for new relations 
between Timorese and between Indonesia and Portugal. 
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Diplomatic offensives on East Timor 
Two diplomatic offensives on East Timor are underway, a UN move to launch a new initiative which 
involves direct consultations with East Timorese opinion, and an Indonesian move to split the East 
Timorese resistance movement abroad. 
Jakarta is working hard to undermine UN and Portuguese 
efforts to find a solution. Since talks between Portugal and 
Indonesia resumed under UN auspices in 1993, it is clear 
that the UN now stands firmly by the principle of General 
Assembly resolution 1514of1960 which requires a solution 
that is acr.ceptable to the people of the territory by means of 
a referendum or other form of assessing the poeple's views. 
UN consults the East Timorese 
In January 1994, two senior UN officials from office of the 
Secretary-General in New York, Director of Political 
Affairs Franscesc Vendrell and Tamrat Samuel, visited 
Lisbon, Jakarta and East Timor. Their primary purpose was 
to formulate a new initiative in time for the next round of 
talks between the two sides in May 1994, in Geneva. 
High on their agenda was consultations with the East 
Timorese, meaning that for the first time, the UN 
Secretary-General's mandate from General Assembly 
resolution 37 /30 of 1982 to consult 'with all parties directly 
concerned' is being implemented. 
In Jakarta, the UN team visited the East Timorese 
resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, in prison. "I am satisfied 
with my visit because he (Gusmao) talked with me freely," 
said Vendrell. Details of the discussion were not divulged. 
The envoys also had talks with Indonesian human rights 
activists, Princen, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Hendardi. 
They all told Vendrell that they consider East Timor's right 
to self-determination to be integral to the human rights 
situation. They agreed that progress on human rights and on 
Xanana's case was essential before a referendum could take 
place. [Radio Netherlands, 24.I.1994) 
As for government circles, their attitude towards the UN 
mission was decidedly cool and the media took the hint. 
Although the visit of an obscure, pro-Indonesian retired 
Portuguese general a few days earlier had been headline 
news, the press all but ignored this high-powered UN team. 
The UN envoys also visited East Timor and held 
discussions with East Timorese contacts including Bishop 
Belo. No details are available although Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas used the occasion to publicly denounce Bishop Belo 
for openly advocating a referendum. 
Jakarta-sponsored 'reconciliation talks' 
Hoping no doubt to take the wind out of the UN's sails, 
Jakarta last year initiated moves to encourage 'anti-
integration' East Timorese to enter into reconciliation talks 
with 'pro-integration' East Timorese. After several false 
starts, the talks eventually took place in December 1993 at 
a secret location outside London. Heading the team from 
Indonesia was Lopes da Cruz, Suharto's special ambassador 
for East Timor affairs, while the team of 'anti-integration' 
Timorese was headed by Abilio Araujo, former chief of 
Fretilin's external delegation who was expelled from Fretilin 
in mid-1993 because he had become involved in this 
Indonesian initiative which is totally rejected by Fretilin. 
Hardly any journalists were given access to the venue. 
Those who did gain access confirmed that the location was 
surrounded by Indonesian security officers. Effendi Arizal, 
political counsellor at the Indonesian embassy in London, 
was clearly in charge. Indonesian diplomats from Spain and 
France were also present. As Abilio Araujo was being 
interviewed by a BBC reporter, his every word was 
monitored by Indonesian officials who videoed and ta'>Cd 
Demo in Seattle during the APEC Summit Conference. 
the encounter, to make sure he said nothing about self-
determination. (Several weeks later, Indonesia's Minister-
Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo 
Sudarman said Araujo was welcome to 'come back to 
Indonesia' for a visit, provided he did not say anything that 
would question East Timor's status. 
Nothing has been revealed about the substance of the 
London talks. A main plank of Indonesia's strategy is to 
split the East Timorese community abroad and win over 
high-level figures well-known in the past for their 
opposition to Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. Their 
major 'catch' is Abilio Araujo but his willingness to enter 
into Jakarta's embrace has only increased his isolation from 
the East Timor community abroad. 
Tutut's Timor role 
It was the unexpected appearance in London of 'Mbak 
Tutut', Suharto's oldest daughter, who held discussions with 
Abilio Araujo, which signalled the importance which 
Suharto himself attaches to this diplomatic initiative. 
Tutut has for some time shown a special interest in East 
Timor. It was her foundation, Yayasan Tiara, which in 1992 
enticed young East Timorese to go Java, promising them 
specialist training and well-paid jobs in Batam industrial 
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complex. They got nothing of the kind and have been living 
in penury, as unskilled, poorly-paid labourers in various 
factories, unable even to raise enough cash to return home 
to East Timor. Tutut's business interests in East Timor, 
especially in land owership along the north coast for a 
tourist project, are well known. 
From the 'social' and the commercial, Tutut is now 
playing a political role. Besides negotiating with Jakarta's 
new Timorese collaborators like Abilio Araujo, she has 
become president of the newly-formed Indonesia-Portugal 
Friendship Association, the counterpart of a Portugal-
Indonesia Friendship Association in Lisbon which is trying 
to undermine the almost unanimous support in Portugal for 
East Timor. Chairing the association in Lisbon is a retired 
general, Carlos Galvao de Melo, who broke from the army 
group that overthrew the fascist Caetano regime in 1974 
because of his extreme right-wing views. In Jakarta in 
January, most newspapers hailed him as the man who 'led' 
the junta. In Dili, he went out of his way to pour scorn on 
East Timor's opposition to integration. Bishop Belo refused 
to meet him and referred to him contemptuously as 
'Indonesia's ambassador to Portugal'. 
Continued on p. 13 
Seven Timorese leave for Portugal 
Seven East Timorese students who sought asylum at the Swedish and Finnish embassies in Jakarta in 
June have at last been allowed to leave Indonesia. For the first time, Timorese asylum-seekers have 
got their way. 
The seven men, Mateus Brito Ximenes, Jose Manuel da 
Oliveira Sousa, Oscar Golcalves, Clementino Fario, Ventura 
Valentim, Profirio da Costa Oliveira and Florencio 
Anunciacao Fernandes (see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 118, 
August 1993) left Jakarta under the protection of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross on 30 December 
and arrived in Lisbon on New Year's Eve to the enthusiastic 
welcome of the Timorese community. 
Ever since they were thrown out of the two embassies just 
days after entering them, four of them have lived under the 
protection of Indonesian human rights activist, Haji J.C. 
Princen. The three who had to leave the Finnish embassy 
spent their fust month or so in the home of Lopes da Cruz, 
special ambassador for East Timor affairs, then left to stay 
on church premises, also under Princen's protection. 
Bitter memories 
In a meeting with Foreign Minister Durau Barroso in 
Lisbon, the three initially held at Lopes da Cruz' home said 
that 'Chico' Lopes had interrogated them as if he were an 
inteJJigence agent, wanting to know who was 'behind' the 
12 November 1991 demonstration in Dili, Xanana Gusmao 
or the Bishop of Dili. 
They later harshly criticised the Finnish embassy in 
particular. Contrary to their belief that Finland was a 
country that respected human rights, the embassy turned out 
to be a place "in which ·the Indonesian military had 
complete freedom of action, coming and going as they 
pleased". 
At a press conference, Portugal did not escape criticism, 
for having done nothing until the Santa Cruz massacre, 
broadcast on TV. "It was only after Santa Cruz," said 
V alentim Ventura, "that Portugal and the rest of the world 
opened their eyes to the Timor issue. The sad part is that 
for the past 17 years, there have been worse massacres but 
nobody said anything at all". 
At a meeting in the presidential palace, Portuguese 
President, Mario Soares, promised he would call on the UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali to redouble his 
efforts to discover the whereabouts of the hundreds of 
young East Timorese who have been missing since the 
1991 massacre. 
The seven Timorese. Photo taken in Jakarta, before seeking 
asylum in the two embassies. 
The government has promised to help them with their 
studies. The Foreign Minister said that although Jakarta's 
decision to allow them to leave was a positive sign, "it 
should not be forgotten that the heart of the Timor problem 
has stiJJ to be solved". (Publico, l.I.1994] 
·-·· ... :·~ 11MOR : tile basic facts 
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Dealing with the Timorese resistance 
The claim that only a few remnants of the East Timorese resistance are left is a recurring theme. 
Major-General Theo Syafei, whose military command oversees East Timor, says there are no more 
than 90 members. The resistance is now portrayed as small gangs of criminals, murdering and looting 
villagers. While these stories are the usual Indonesian rhetoric, some new elements have emerged. 
Major-General Theo Syafei has promised to withdraw all 
combat troops, replacing them with territorial troops. As 
expJained in TAPOL Bulletin, [No. 120, December 1993], 
the switch from combat troops to territorial troops is in 
anticipation of the growth of the resistance in the urban 
areas. A new factor has now been added, the deployment of 
Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) units in East Timor. 
The emergence of the Police 
In most countries the police is separate from the armed 
forces but in Indonesia, POLRI is an integral part of ABRI. 
For years it has been left to the military to enforce law and 
order, but now serious efforts have been made to increase 
the role of POLRI. In the present upsurge of demonstrations 
in many of Indonesia's big cities, it is increasingly the 
police, or more precisely, Brimob, the Police special forces, 
who confront and arrest demonstrators. The military plays 
a back-up role and only steps in if Brimob cannot handle 
the situation. 
The same scheme is now being applied in East Timor. 
While Falintil guerrillas will still be hunted down by army 
crack-troops, the clandestine front in the urban areas will 
be handled by Brimob. This special forte has been given 
training to deal with crisis situations. Well equipped with 
truncheons and riot shields, Brimob is geared towards 
handling large crowds in demonstrations and mass rallies. 
Police officers have had anti-riot training in Germany, the 
UK and Australia. 
Since 1991, demonstrators in Dili have experienced the 
heavy-handed methods of the police, but the appearance of 
Brimob units in the streets of Dili and Baucau will only 
heighten the tension in East Timor. 
Changing the name of the game 
The resistance in East Timor is still called 'GPK/Fretilin by 
the authorities, which totally misrepresents the Timorese 
resistance. In a New Year statement to the press, Police 
Major-General Amrin Syarofi, Police Chief of the Nusa 
Tenggara islands, including East Timor, enumerated the so-
called 'crimes' of the resistance, calling them murders, 
robberies and assaults. Peering through the mist of con-
fusion created by his categories, it is clear that the level of 
armed conflict is far greater that the army will admit. In 
1993, says the police chief, there were 79 'robberies', 12 
'murders' and 3 attacks causing injuries as compared with 
21 'robberies' and 15 'murders' in 1992. He also listed 'anti-
integrasi' acts to 'undermine (merongrong) the Indonesian 
state': 15 incidents in 1993 including 8 cases of illegal 
pamphleteering, 3 cases of unfurling illegal banners, 3 of 
pulling down the Indonesian flag and one case of raising 
the flag of an independent East Timor. In 1992 there were 
4 cases of illegal pamphleteering and 8 illegal meetings. 
Two things should be noted. This report was made by the 
Police Chief not, as in the past, the military commander. 
Second, the use of such words as 'criminal' shows a shift in 
terminology. The resistance is now to be portrayed as 
'bandits'. In the words of Amrin Syarofi, talk of the 'GPK/-
Fretilin' killing and robbing people can be beneficial for 
Indonesia's standing on the international arena. [Suara 
Karya, 3.I.1994] 
Typical of this new word-play is a report filed by AP on 
24 January. It reports the killing of two 'villagers' one of 
whom, Mariano Alves, "led a local spear platoon against 
the pro-independence fighters". Alves was clearly under 
arms and this could only have been a Timorese fighting 
alongside Indonesian troops in an armed encounter with the 
resistance. The police chiefs 1994 figures will list this as a 
'murder'. 
The police chief expressed confidence that the deployment 
of Brimob units in East Timor would improve security. 
Brimob operations will be known as Operasi Kamtibmas 
(Keamanan dan Penertiban Masyarakat), security and order 
operation. It is not known how many companies of Brimob 
will be despatched. 
STOP PRESS 
Theo Syafei replaced 
Major-General Theo Syafei has been replaced as com-
mander of the Udayana Regional Military Command based 
in Denpasar, Bali. The new commander is Brigadier-
General Adang Ruchiatna, currently commander of the first 
division of KOSTRAD, the strategic reserve command. He 
is likely to come from KOPASSUS, the crack troops. 
For the past two years, Theo Syafei has been in control of 
military operations in East Timor, first as commander of 
KOIAKOPS in Dili, then as commander of the Udayana 
Command where he was far more directly associated with 
the situation in East Timor than his predecessors in this 
post. 
Syafei's replacement less than a year after taking over the 
regional military command suggests that the move is not 
routine but may signal a change in the regime's policy 
towards security and military operations in East Timor. It 
is too early to speculate further on the significance of 
Syafei's removal. 
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Timorese prisoners appeal to the ICJ 
Six of the eight East Timorese who were convicted under 
the anti-subversion law in 1992 for participating in the 
peaceful demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 and 
given very harsh sentences, wrote to the Geneva-based 
International Commission of Jurists on 28 September 1993, 
asking for help to invalidate their trials and sentences. The 
six signatories are: Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha (serving 
life), Francisco Miranda Branco (15 years), Saturnino da 
Costa Belo (9 years, raised to 10 or 12 on appeal), 
Filomeno da Silva Ferreira (5 years, 8 months), Juvencio 
de Jesus Martins (6 year, 10 months) and Jacinto das 
Neves R. Alves (10 years). 
Drawing by a Timorese prisoner in Cipinang prison. 
During the first month after their arrest, they wrote, they 
were subjected to prolonged and intensive interrogation by 
army intelligence from 7am daily often till 3am the next 
day; they were ill-treated and under severe psychological 
pressure. During this period, the security forces needed to 
select which of the Timorese under arrest would be 
scapegoated by being put on trial. In the second period, 
which lasted about two months, questioning was in the 
hands of the attorney-general's office and BAIS (Strategic 
Intelligence) in sessions sometimes lasting 12 hours a day. 
The prisoners described how the authorities tried to 
prevent LBH lawyers from handling their cases. Also, they 
were told that if they did as they were told and pleaded 
guilty, they would get lighter sentences. None of them 
responded to this cheap enticement. Although the trial 
sessions were allegedly open, many civilians and even 
relatives of the defendants were prevented from attending. 
Among the witnesses who testified against them - the 
victims - were army officers who were responsible for the 
massacre. 
Defendants' testimony ignored 
Court verdicts and sentences ignored the juridical status of 
East Timor as a non-self-governing territory under 
international law, as well as the defendants' testimonies. 
False information about the demonstrators possessing arms 
was accepted although no evidence was produced. 
After being sentenced, the convicted men were denied 
their rights, under Indonesian law, to be assisted in lodging 
appeals against the verdicts; on the contrary, they were kept 
in total isolation in dark cells. The appeal courts also 
ignored statements submitted by their lawyers. (In all cases, 
their sentences were upheld on appeal, except for Saturnino, 
whose sentence was increased.) 
How the ICJ can help 
* It should press the Indonesian government to allow an 
investigation of the trials by a group of international jurists 
and seek the assistance of the International Platform of 
Jurists for East Timor for them to lodge appeals with an 
impartial court. 
* Help to provide an exact definition of East Timor's status 
under international law. 
* Attend all future trials held in East Timor. 
* Have those responsible for the slaughter of 200,000 East 
Timorese people since the Indonesian occupation brought 
to justice before the International Court in The Hague. 
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Torture in Aceh 
Reports about human rights abuses in Aceh are scarce but recently, Acehnese refugees (or survivors) 
ill neighbouring countries gave accounts of bestial treatment by KOPASSUS, the Indonesian crack 
troops. Aceh remains one of the most inaccessible areas in the Indonesian archipelago. Only on rare 
occasions do reports appear that make it clear that the situation is still tense. 
One occasion was the appointment of the new sub-district 
military commander of East Aceh on 23 December 1993. In 
his message district military commander, Colonel Sridono 
stressed the strategic importance of East Aceh; it remains a 
region with a high level of disturbance (kerawanan cu/cup 
tinggi.) and in the !>3St was the base for the GPK (Gerakan 
Pengacau Keamanan, Security Disruptor Gang), the usual 
name given to the Free Aceh Movement. Sridono stressed 
the territorial mission of the military, which means tight 
social control of the population. He spoke of its economic 
importance, its elaborate agricultural plots, forestry-indus-
trial plantations and oil fields. The Sridono speech is the 
latest indication that East Aceh is still in turmoil. 
The survivors in Malaysia 
Many thousands of Acehnese fled to neighbouring Malaysia 
in the early nineties. The exact number is difficult to 
estimate, as the majority have assimilated among the locals; 
many Malaysians have blood relations with Acehnese or are 
from the country. While a few hundred refugees are being 
held in awful conditions by the Malaysian authorities, there 
are groups of Free Aceh Movement cadres who travel in 
and out of Malaysia. It is virtualJy impossible to investigate 
the situation in Aceh, but the Acehnese in Malaysia are 
living examples of the brutality of the Indonesian troops. 
Three detailed accounts by Acehnese who escaped from 
Indonesian captivity have reached the outside world. 
Torture and killings 
Reports from a range of human rights organisations and 
individuals agree on some basic facts: extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances and torture of those in captivity are normal 
practice. The three accounts confirm these facts. 
The first is from Nasruddin Ismael, 22, a farmer from 
Peureulak, arrested on 8 March 1991 by Kopassus, the red 
beret commandos, while working at a Plantation in Alue 
Nireb. His only 'crime' was that he was the nephew of 
Razali Hamid, a local leader of the Free Aceh Movement. 
Nasruddin was taken to the Kopassus interrogation centre 
and beaten unconscious with truncheons. He was taken by 
truck to the notorious Tualang Cut prison together with 
other prisoners. On the way, two prisoners were strangled 
and their bodies dumped in public in the streets of Sungoe 
Raja village. Another prisoner was clubbed to death and his 
body thrown in the river. By the end of the journey, another 
four prisoners had died of torture and their bodies were 
thrown in Kuala Simpang River. In the 7 days and nights 
of his detention, Nasruddin was moved from the Peureulak 
detention camp to Tualang Cut prison several times. In this 
brief period he experienced terrible treatment and witnessed 
the suffering of other prisoners. 
His stubborn refusal to deny his family kinship with the 
local freedom fighter probably saved bis life. At one point, 
after a heavy interrogation session when his ribs were 
broken, he was taken to Lhok Nihong, a densely forested 
area. While the soldiers were relaxing, he made his escape 
and went underground. It took him months to recover. 
The Lamuello prison 
Ibrahim bin Yacob endured four months' imprisonment in 
Lamuello prison. He was an active member of the Free 
Aceh Movement; bis cover was eventually blown in a series 
of mass arrests and interrogations. He was arrested by a 
platoon of Kopassus soldiers Jed by Captain Rubiono in the 
town of Beureunan on 22 May 1993 and thrown into a pool 
of human excrement during interrogation. He was then 
beaten with truncheons and given electric shocks. The food 
was dreadful, no visitor or lawyer was allowed. Only after 
strong international · pressure was the ICRC allowed to visit 
several prisons, including Lamuello. Ibrahim bin Yacob 
names 13 prisoners who were with him there. Eight of them 
are probably still in detention: Dr. Syamsuddin, Hamid, 
Angkasah, Abdu1.lah, Mahmud, Umar Tong Weng, Ibrahim 
and Muhammad Lambot. The other five, Banta Sulaiman, 
Iljas, Jafar, Zulkarnaini and Zubaili, were moved to Ran-
tjong Prison, the most notorious prison in Aceh. Usually 
people who are moved to Rantjong Prison 'disappear'. 
Ibrahim managed to escape. His report includes a drawing 
of Lamuello prison, showing the sites of mass graves. 
Lhok Nga Prison 
Said Mustafa Usab bin Said Usman, 32, from the sub-
district of Meulabob, was detained from 7 August 1990 till 
16 August 1991. The first days were atrocious, the torture 
temporarily paralysed him. For 17 days he was beaten, 
given electric shocks, burned and thrown in cold water in 
the middle of the night. On 26 August 1990 he was moved 
to Lhok Nga Prison and the torture continued on three 
occasions up to October 1990. 
He gives the names of many fellow prisoners. Lhok Nga 
prison is used for tried prisoners and one of the few visited 
by the ICRC. Said Mustafa describes the ICRC visit on 11 
June 1991 as the happiest day during his captivity. The 
authorities said only 10 of the detainees were political 
prisoners and the rest common criminals, but after the 
ICRC visit, conditions improved a bit. Said includes two 
pages of names of prisoners, tried and untried, and some 
who were murdered. 
After his release the Indonesian military intelligence still 
bunting for him, so he decided to flee to Malaysia. 
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West Papuan refugees express their concerns 
West Papuans at the East Awin refugee camp have written to TAPOL in response to a UNHCR 
document accusing us of giving a 'very false picture' of conditions in the camp. The UNHCR has not 
answered or even acknowledged TAPOL ~ two letters sent to the agency more than two months ago. 
The UNHCR criticisms of reports published in earlier 
Bulletins were never sent to TAPOL. The document was 
reproduced in the September 1993 issue of West Papua 
Courier. [See TAPOL Bulletin No. 120, December 1993] 
Writing on behalf of WPYSA, the organisation of West 
Papuans at the camp, Julius Ireeuw, said the UNHCR has 
failed to resolve the status problem of the refugees. So far 
they have only been accepted as prima facie refugees which 
does not allow them to move freely out the East Awin 
camp. Their determination as refugees entitled to permissive 
residence would require screening by the UNHCR but this 
has not been done although the West Papuans fled across to 
PNG ten years ago, in February 1984. Nor has the agency 
acted to obtain third-country resettlement for them. 
The world agency has been responsible for the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. One condition for repatriation was 
that the International Red Cross (ICRC) would monitor the 
returnees, but now the ICRC has closed its office in West 
Papua and church and missionary organisations which also 
monitor the returnees have been told by the Indonesian 
government that all foreign missionaries will have to leave 
by July 1994. This means that there will no longer be any 
independent agencies present to protect the returnees, said 
Ireeuw. All efforts by the refugees to be resettled in 
Australia have failed, despite support for this aim from the 
Refugee Council of Australia. 
Ireeuw said the UNHCR which is now planning to 
withdraw its support for the camp may regard the problem 
of West Papuan refugees as insignificant, compared to 
refugee problems elsewhere in the world. But "even though 
we amount to just a few thousand people, we are entitled to 
protection and the solution to our dilemma in accordance 
with the UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees". It was 
this sense of frustration that sparked the demonstration at 
the camp in January 1993 when the UNHCR flag was 
pulled down and a West Papuan flag unfurled in its place. 
He denied the UNHCR contention that those involved in 
the action had surrendered to the police. 
Voiceless 
With regard to physical conditions at the camp, Ireeuw 
referred us to a series of articles in Times of PNG last 
December. Seeing their problems in the global context, he 
wrote: 
"Refugees are a tangible human symbol of problems 
afflicting contemporary society: persecution, war, civil 
conflict and intolerance. (We suffer) feeling of loss, alien-
ation and displacement and are often referred to as 'the 
uprooted~ 'the unwanted' or 'the homeless'. But if there is 
one thing common to the disparate groups called refugees, 
it is that they are effectively voiceless. This is not to suggest 
that they are inevitably passive or incapable of express 
their aspirations. Far from it. But they are disen-
franchised,... and rarely have direct access to the people 
who are taking far-reaching decisions about their lives." 
The refugees invited TAPOL to visit the camp "to assist 
us in gaining a better understanding of the situation here". 
PNG journalists highlight problems 
The refugees were able to describe their problems to PNG 
Times journalists who visited East Awin camp last year. 
"Our shelter is made of plastics, tree stumps, barks of 
trees, sago leaves, reeds. There is no proper medical care 
and very limited drugs. Many have died as a result. 
"The UNHCR {has) sponsored primary education since 
1988 and the schools are run by Montfort Catholic Mission 
(Canada) .... But the fact is that primary education at East 
Awin is not recognised so the children cannot enrol in high 
schools throughout PNG to further their education. 
"Life in the camp is hard. We have to survive by produc-
ing our own food. the soil is not fertile enough for intensi-
fication so we have to chop the trees all the time for new 
gardens. Gardening for highlanders is easier but coastal 
people, used to fishing and sago, find it bard. Sometimes 
they collect sago but this produces conflicts with local 
people. 
"Fighting has occurred because refugees trespass and cut 
sago palms.... In one case, the hut made by refugees in the 
bush for hunting was burnt down and food items taken 
away." 
There are one hundred widows and fifty orphans among 
the refugees for whom the work of building huts and 
creating gardens is particularly difficult. 
One refugee hit on the idea of building a canoe for 
transport back and forth to Kiunga. A tree was felled with 
the permission of the locals and it took three months to 
make the canoe. But the chances of making more canoes 
have disappeared because local people will no longer allow 
them to fell any trees. 
They are not allow to go more than one kilometre from 
the camp boundary into local land. When refugees ventured 
further than this in the dry season to garden and hunt, their 
relations with local people grew tense. 
"Give us permissive residence! " 
John Wakum speaking for the refugees, said the govern-
ment and the UNHCR should create projects to help them 
become self-reliant. But above all, The government must 
consider giving the refugees permissive residence. "We 
request them to look into our currenct prima facie status 
and grant us permissive status." [Times of PNG, 2.I.1994] 
In TAPOL's opinion, these demands are justified. The fate 
of these people cannot be allowed to drag on unresolved. 
The stalement is evidently the result of hesitancy by the 
PNG government, anxious not to upset its powerful neigh-
bour. Surely it is for the UNHCR to seek a solution and not 
tum a blind eye to the fate of these refugees, as seems to be 
their policy at present. 
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Norman Lewis, An Empire of the East, Travels 
in Indonesia. Jonathan Cape, London, 236 pp. 
Hardback, price: £16.99. 
Visit any major bookshop anywhere in the UK and you will 
be hard put to find any books about Indonesia. Even on the 
specialist shelves, there is little to be found. So the 
appearance of a book by this country's best known and best 
Joved travel writer, sporting such an uncompromising title, 
is bound to drawn attention to a country still so little 
understood. Add to this the fact that he chose to travel in 
the three regions which, as he writes, have "withstood the 
standardising processes of the Indonesian government" -
Aceh, East Timor and West Papua - and there is reason to 
hope that perceptions of Jakarta and its imperialist 
ambitions are likely to take a significant leap forward. 
Moreover, the enthusiastic reviews that have appeared in 
the major newspapers will assure the book a wide audience. 
The author is certainly a seasoned traveller (now well into 
his eighties) and makes light of the most arduous situations: 
He shies away from the comforts of the tourist trail and 
makes a point of visiting places still largely off the beat~n 
track. He is a keen observer of how people who are still 
largely untouched by the 'civilising' influences of 
missionaries and government administrators attempt against 
great odds to preserve their identities. 
Although he does not set out to argue in favour of a 
particular cause, Norman Lewis is not a neutral spectator. 
Indeed, he was instrumental in helping to bring Survival 
International into being, following a journey through Brazil 
after which he published an essay entitled Genocide in a 
major Sunday paper, causing a great stir.' 
Aceh 
During his travels in Aceh with his son and a friend, 
accompanied by a reluctant Acebnese 'guide', the reader is 
frequently reminded of the overwhelming presence of an 
army bent on crushing a revolt though there are few 
encounters with people who can provide an insight into 
what it means to live in such a state of terror. His anger is 
directed in particular at the wanton destruction of forests, 
which is happening even faster in Indonesia than in Brazil. 
He laments the dereliction caused by a transmigration site 
that he happens upon. For one logger he met "who had just 
turned a half-million acres of a forest in Aceh into cement 
sacks", the future was bright: "From now on, it's golf 
courses. This is going to be the paradise of Japanese 
golfers." 
East Timor 
In East Timor, travelling now with his daughter, lewis 
struck up a friendship with Salesian nuns who run an 
orphanage in Venilale. With their help, the travellers moved 
around with ease and enjoyed the hospitality of Catholic 
clergy and nuns. On a trip to Lospalos, they travelled for 
miles through barren stretches which are now known as 
'dead earth' "because aJJ those who had ftlled it were dead 
and gone and human activity had come to an end". 
He is unstinting in his praise of the Catholic clergy and 
sisters who have sided with the people of East Timor. They 
are to be admired like the clergy he has learnt to admire in 
Bolivia and Brazil, working in isolation among the 
dispossessed, though in East Timor, he points out, the 
magnitude and complexity of the problems they face are 
much greater. He was especially moved by a ceremony ~o 
instal local chieftains, on which Bishop Belo confe~ed h~ 
blessings, celebrated in traditional style. It w~ dunng ~ 
ceremony, as dancers whipped themselves m~o a bnef 
frenzy that a man approached him, spoke furtively, then disap~ared in the crowd: "They've been inside for years 
and when you come out, you go to extremes. When they 
took me to Atauro prison, they put me in a coffin ~or four 
months. It's dark. You hear nothing. You see nothing and 
it just fits your body.... Four years in Atauro, then another 
four in Cai-Laco. It leaves its mark. You're never the same 
again." 
West Papua . 
Lewis's travels in West Papua had an altogether different 
flavour about them. The missionaries he meets here could 
hardly have been more different, seeking souls and 
imposing their rituals with little sym~athy !or local 
traditions. These are the men who bnng trinkets as 
enticements, and cajole their 'flock' into building and 
maintaining airstrips, creating advanced bases for church 
and government penetration. 
He introduces the reader to many fascinating people. One 
is a local government teacher who has made the leap from 
Dani culture to Pancasila 'morality' but quickly strips 
himself naked and dons a penis gourd to join in a tribal 
war, knowing full well that such activities are strictly 
prohibited. He meets up with the Dani tribe where Wyn 
Sargent, the US photo-anthropologist, Jived and worked 
until she was hounded out for speaking out against 
atrocities. They still spoke fondly of her as a sadly missed 
friend. Everywhere tribal people were being enticed into 
destroying their traditional habitat and move into 'healthy 
houses' built to strict government specifications, which are 
not only very unhealthy but part of a strategy to drag 
people away from their traditions. But many of these houses 
stand empty or are decked up to appear as if they are lived 
in, a quiet form of resistance to the intrusion of a foreign 
and unwanted power. Continued on p. 8 
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